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The ‘policy mix’ for innovation:  
rethinking innovation policy in a multi-level,  
multi-actor context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have seen the emergence, take-up and use of the term 'policy mix' by 
innovation policy makers and by policy analysts & scholars alike. Imported from 
economic policy debates, the term implies a focus on the interactions and 
interdependencies between different policies as they affect the extent to which 
intended policy outcomes are achieved. However the meaning of the term remains 
ambiguous. Nonetheless, we argue that the emergence of the „policy mix‟ concept 
into common use in the field of innovation policy studies provides us with a window of 
opportunity to reconsider some basic and often hidden assumptions in order to better 
deal with a messy and complex, multi-level, multi-actor reality. We draw on the 
mainstream policy studies literature and on evolutionary thinking in order to re-
conceptualise the basic building blocks of innovation policy studies in order to arrive 
at a useful definition of ‟policy mix‟ interactions. We suggest that this 
reconceptualisation has profound implications for the scope and focus of innovation 
policy studies and for what such studies can realistically hope to achieve in terms of 
policy prescriptions.  
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1 Introduction 
The innovation policy discourse has changed profoundly in recent years. Policy 
makers, scholars and analysts have all moved away from talking about „innovation 
policy‟ or even „innovation policies‟. Instead debates increasingly focus on policy 
complexity and policy co-ordination. This shift in emphasis is exemplified by the 
recent uptake of the term 'policy mix'. Imported from economic policy debates, the 
term implies a focus on interactions and interdependencies between different policies 
as they affect the extent to which intended outcomes are realised. The recent 
popularity of the term seems to reflect, then, an aspiration towards a more realistic 
approach to policy complexity. However, we argue that in practice the term is largely 
used to „black box‟ this complexity.  
 
We believe that it is time not simply to acknowledge this complexity but to grapple 
with it. We agree wholeheartedly with Morlacchi and Martin (2009) that innovation 
policy studies, as a field of research, is at something of a crossroads. As a „discipline‟ 
it has been extraordinarily successful over several decades in persuading policy-
makers of the importance of innovation and the need for active innovation policies. 
However, it may be that, in this process, the innovation policy research community 
has lost the „critical reflexivity‟ which Morlachhi and Martin feel is necessary to 
sustain both the instrumental and critical roles of innovation policy research in the 
longer term. We take up this challenge, spelling out the elements we believe are 
necessary to an analytically useful conceptualisation of policy complexity. We outline 
an approach to „policy mixes‟ compatible with a more sophisticated, multi-actor, multi-
level and dynamic understanding of the processes by which policies relevant to 
innovation emerge, interact and have effects. We do this by critically reflecting upon 
the innovation policy studies status quo and by drawing upon insights both from the 
mainstream policy studies literature and from evolutionary thinking in both political 
studies and economics. The paper does not explore specific „policy mixes‟. Nor does 
it attempt to prescribe appropriate or effective instrument combinations. Indeed we 
will suggest that it is unrealistic to seek to identify unambiguously „good‟ policy mixes 
for innovation. Instead of making prescriptions about the specific content of public 
policy for innovation we focus on improving our fundamental understanding of policy 
processes and especially of policy learning.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we briefly outline the origin and diffusion of the 
term „policy mix‟, before exploring the relevance of the term for innovation policy 
studies. Then, we begin our problematisation of public policy complexity by exploring 
the setting of policy agendas and the shaping of policy rationales. We next turn to 
problematise actors and agency in innovation policy processes, arguing that, despite 
the recent interest in „multi-actor‟ innovation policy, this aspect of innovation policy 
studies is particularly under-conceptualised. Having considered actors, we go on to 
consider policy action, exploring the implications of the adoption in much of the 
innovation policy studies literature of a simplistic approach towards „policy 
instruments‟. Having considered action, we finally turn to interaction between public 
policies, exploring the range of dimensions across which interactions can occur. Here 
we emphasise the need for a genuinely dynamic view of policy interactions. In the 
final section we draw together our conclusions. 
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2 The origin of the term and its adoption in innovation policy studies 
The term „policy mix‟ emerged in the economic policy literature in the 1960s, 
specifically that dealing with the relationship and interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policy. Amongst his contributions Nobel Economics Prize winner Robert 
Mundell (1962) noted that, under one condition, a floating exchange rate, monetary 
policy becomes a powerful tool for stabilising the economy whilst fiscal policy 
becomes powerless, whereas under a fixed exchange rate the opposite becomes 
true. Mundell pioneered the concept of the fiscal/monetary policy mix which later 
came to prominence in the economic policy debates around European Economic and 
Monetary Union1 (see e.g. Claeys, 2006). A search of the International Bibliography 
for the Social Sciences shows that the term 'policy mix' remains largely confined to 
economic policy debates until the late 1980‟s/early 1990s at which point it not only 
explodes within the economic policy literature with the increased attention to EMU 
but is also extended to other areas of public policy to explore the interaction between 
different policies/instrument to achieve a particular goal or outcomes (see for 
instance Stroick and Jenson, 1999 on the 'best policy mix for Canada's young 
children'). The most significant extension of the concept 2 has been into the literature 
on environmental policy and regulation, where it has been especially used to explore 
interactions and trade-offs between different policies in terms of climate change 
policy and carbon emissions reduction (see for instance ETAN Expert Working 
Group, 1998; Sorrel and Sijm, 2003). 
 
Recent years have seen the transfer of the term to the innovation policy arena. 
Though scholars have periodically discussed the need for innovation policy-makers 
to consider a „mix‟ of objectives and policy instruments (e.g. Smith, 1994; Branscomb 
& Florida, 1998) the term „policy mix‟ seems to have found its way into the innovation 
policy discourse around the beginning of this decade via both the environmental 
policy discourse (the ETAN Expert Working Group mentioned above explored the 
R&D challenges presented by climate change and included influential innovation 
policy analysts active in the subsequent dissemination of the term) and via the 
macro-economic policy discourse through the conclusions of the Lisbon Council in 
March 2000, in which the importance of increased R&D expenditures and a 
favourable macro-economic policy mix for continued economic growth are discussed 
more or less side-by-side3. A STRATA-ETAN Expert Group on Benchmarking 
National RTD Policies (2002), later summarized by Soete and Corpakis (2003), 
states that effective policy learning from cross-country comparison requires “an 
understanding of the ways in which individual instruments are combined into effective 
policy mixes within national innovation systems”. Subsequently, in response to the 
Barcelona target for raising R&D investment to 3 per cent of GDP and the 
Commission‟s Action Plan, a CREST (European Union Scientific and Technical 
Research Committee) Expert Group on „Public Research Spending and Policy Mixes‟ 
was charged with stimulating the implementation of parts of the Action Plan via a 
process of mutual learning under the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)4. The 
level of activity under the CREST/OMC banner since 2003-4 has led to the 
                                                 
1 Mundell himself being a consultant to the Monetary Committee of the EEC in 1970, and later a member of its 
Study Group on Economic and Monetary Union. 
2 And, from our trawl of the IBSS, the earliest, with a 1995 paper by Reimund Schwarze, ―Haftungsrecht und 
Auflagen als Policy-Mix‖ (―Liability and regulation as policy mix‖).  
3 We are grateful to Ken Guy for this observation. 
4 In subsequent cycles of OMC activity in this area the focus on policy mix design and ‗fine-tuning‘ has continued, 
with the commissioning, production and analysis of national cases and the promotion of policy learning through 
peer review of national policies by peers from other member states. For details and reports see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/coordination/coordination01_en.htm  
8 
 
„mainstreaming‟ of the policy mix term into Europe‟s monitoring and analysis efforts 
through activities like ERAWatch and the dedicated 'Policy Mix' project 
commissioned by DG RTD5. In addition, the OECD Working Party on Innovation and 
Technology Policy (TIP) has conducted a number of peer-review based reports to 
examine innovation policy mixes in a set of volunteer countries with the aim of better 
understanding how innovation policy mixes differ among OECD countries and 
provide further insight into how such differences contribute to overall policy 
effectiveness. 
 
We believe that the uptake of the policy mix concept reflects two developments in 
innovation policy studies. First, there is a general recognition that innovation-driven 
economic success depends on more than traditionally-conceived S&T policies. This 
realisation is typified by the rise of 'systemic' rationales and more recent trends 
towards new typologies of innovation policies which recognise the role of „indirect‟ as 
well as traditional 'direct' measures and „demand-side‟ as well as „supply-side‟ 
measures or instruments (see e.g. Soete and Corpakis, 2003; Georghiou, 2006; 
Smits and Kuhlman, 2004)6. This expansion of the legitimate scope of innovation 
policy implies that instruments intended to achieve other policy goals (such as 
procurement, regulation, education, tax measures, etc) could or should be „co-opted‟ 
in the service of innovation policy. As Nauwelaers and Wintjes (2008) put it, 
innovation has “invaded” the agendas of many traditional policy fields (p.286). Borrás 
(2009) characterises a process both of “widening” and “deepening” of innovation 
policy, with the introduction of new and more sophisticated policy instruments 
(widening) and an expansion of the realm of action for innovation policy (deepening).  
 
The second realisation is that modern states are increasingly characterised by a 
dispersal of power not merely upwards and downwards from the national level to 
supra- and sub-national actors, but also outwards to quasi-state actors and non-state 
actors. This is not confined to innovation policy studies and is articulated in general 
political and policy studies discourse by the substitution of traditional state-centric 
models of government and 'public administration' with new ideas about multi-level, 
multi-actor 'governance' and „New Public Management‟ (see e.g. Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994).  
 
The realisations discussed above are not simply the result of scholarly 
developments. Even whilst the dispersal of power from traditional state actors just 
mentioned arguably makes it harder for policy-makers to use traditional direct levers, 
let alone set „framework conditions‟, expectations about the scope for public action 
on the part of analysts and policy makers alike remain high7. Possibly for this reason, 
policy-makers8 have sought new conceptualisations to account for the relative failure 
of traditional research and innovation policies to transform the innovation 
performance of nation states.  
 
Despite its new-found popularity in innovation policy studies, then, the „policy mix‟ 
term remains under-conceptualised9. Regardless of this, normative assertions are 
                                                 
5 ―Monitoring and analysis of policies and public financing instruments conducive to higher levels of R&D 
investments‖ Contract No. DG-RTD-2005-M-01-02. See http://www.policymix.eu/ for more information. 
6 Supply-side innovation policies represent the older tradition of aid through finance (grants, tax incentives and 
public venture capital) and aids through the provision of public services (brokerage services, incubators, science 
parks, etc). Demand-side policies would include relatively new tools such as 'systemic instruments' (Smits and 
Kuhlman, 2004), for instance the use of regulation and standard-setting to incentivise innovation and promote 
‗lead markets‘.    
7 A situation which usually leads to calls for more ‗co-ordination‘, a point to which we will return below. 
8 Especially European policy-makers 
9 The concept in itself is seen as self-explanatory and unproblematic. The only working definition we can find in 
the context of innovation policy is that proposed by the ‗Policy Mix‘ project, which defines the policy mix for 
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made about policy mixes. What is needed are „appropriate‟, „effective‟, or „balanced‟ 
policy mixes (Soete and Corpakis, 2003; CREST Policy Mix Expert group, 2007; 
UNU-MERIT et al, 2009; Wieczorek et al, 2009). Achieving this is seen as a 
challenge of „coherence‟ and „co-ordination‟. The assumption seems to be that policy 
makers are underutilising the full portfolio of instruments theoretically available to 
them and that this is a bad thing. This implicit conceptualisation entails not only a 
normative assumption about composition but is also rather static. Change only 
occurs insofar as the complexity of the policy mix increases with the introduction of 
„new‟ instruments. 
 
Using the term „policy mix‟ simply as shorthand for an expanding portfolio of 
innovation policy instruments necessarily involves making a value judgement as to 
what currently constitutes (or should constitute) the boundaries of innovation policy10.  
A second value judgement is also implicitly made in this discourse, whereby 
„innovation‟ is transformed from a means to achieving a broad range of public policy 
goals into a policy goal for a broad range of public policy domains11.  
 
The popular use of the term without any clear attempt at definition places it firmly in 
Markusen‟s (2003) category of „fuzzy concepts‟12. We have already noted that this 
fuzziness has not stopped the term being associated with normative prescriptions. 
We believe that such prescriptions depend on an implicit model of the policy process 
which runs counter to the very trends the term ostensibly reflects. We detect an 
implicit assumption that policy mixes can be meaningfully considered at a single level 
of governance and that „co-ordination‟ (itself considered to be an unproblematic 
activity necessitated by growing policy complexity) can in principle be done by a 
single, objective, rational and neutral overseeing policy maker. In a world of 
dispersed, multi-level and multi-actor governance patterns „co-ordination‟ in this 
sense is clearly impossible. As Hay (1999, p322, original emphasis) notes, the state 
as a “complex and institutionally fragmented system (of systems) has no innate 
propensity to proactive and reflexive transformation as a system”. In order to engage 
in a process of reflexive self-transformation, the state “must display the 
characteristics of a unified actor, “not merely co-ordinating its multifarious practices, 
but co-ordinating the process by which these are reconstituted and re-co-ordinated” 
but in order to do so the fragmented state must first constitute itself as a unified actor, 
something which may be possible only rarely (Hay, 1999, p322).  
 
It is hard enough to see how any policy actor operating within a system of policy 
systems can at the same time step outside the system and take a rational and 
objective overview. It is even harder to imagine how the resulting impetus to co-
ordination would be legitimated and accepted within that system. Co-ordination then 
can at best mean mutual adjustment between actors and systems within this larger 
system of systems. It seems to us that this is often not what is implied when 
innovation policy analysts demand better „co-ordination‟.  
                                                                                                                                            
R&D (the focus of that study) as the combination of policy instruments which interact to influence the quantity 
and quality of R&D investments in public and private sectors (UNU-MERIT et al, 2009, p3). 
10 Even in making this judgment, analysts and scholars rarely question why certain instruments and policy domains 
are added to the broad innovation policy arena (or why some are consigned into obscurity). The influence of 
fashionable ideas, imitation, and other policy rationales (Laranja et al, 2008) clearly play a role. 
11 Witt (2003) observe that ―an implicit presumption in evolutionary economics and its policy making applications 
is that innovativeness […] is, by and large, beneficial and therefore ought to be encouraged‖. Morlacchi and 
Martin (2009) imply a similar criticism in their reflections on the need for a fundamental and critical debate about 
the goals and roles of innovation policy studies. 
12. In a strong critique of influential concepts in economic geography such as ‗Learning Regions‘ and ‗World 
Cities‘ Markusen (2003) defines a fuzzy concept as ―one which posits an entity, phenomenon or process which 
possesses two or more alternative meanings and thus cannot be reliably identified or applied by different readers or 
scholars‖ (p.702). 
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The policy mix concept as applied in innovation policy discourses, then, seems to 
downplay Mundell‟s original emphasis on the interactions between policy instruments 
as they seek to achieve a single, identified policy goal13, emphasising instead the 
accumulation of instruments and „co-ordination‟ (conceived unproblematically). We 
believe that if the policy mix concept is to add genuine value to innovation policy 
analysis this must lie in forcing our attention to the trade-offs between policies as 
they impact upon the extent to which the ultimate intended goals or outcomes of 
innovation policy are realized, in a particular space and at a particular time. We now 
turn our attention to the various elements of the policy process which are relevant to 
this task. 
 
3 Agenda-setting and policy rationales 
Citing Richard Nelson‟s (1977) The Moon and the Ghetto, Morlacchi and Martin 
(2009) lament that “the genesis of policy problems and research problems is a critical 
process in STI policy, just as much as deciding how those problems can be 
addressed, yet we do not have any satisfactory theory for this” (p. 580). However this 
process has been extensively explored in the policy studies literature, with agenda 
setting, advocacy and the evolution of ideas the focus of much attention in recent 
decades. Determining how political and policy agendas are set and who is involved 
demands a more dynamic perspective than is seen in traditional policy studies (and 
in nearly all innovation policy studies) and the outcome of this substantial literature 
on agenda-setting has been a new and promising interest in evolutionary accounts of 
policy and politics14. 
 
The innovation policy literature often implies that theory-based rationales are the 
primary driver of policy development. The policy process is seen as proceeding in 
linear discrete stages, implying a one to one mapping between scholarly ideas and 
policy rationales, and between policy rationales and policy instruments.  Accounts of 
shifts in innovation policy are mapped onto changes in scholarly ideas, with the 
implication that the former are caused by the latter (e.g. Ruivo, 1994; Elzinga and 
Jamison, 1995). Conversely, when giving policy recommendations, innovation 
scholars implicitly assume an unproblematic and straightforward translation of these 
into the formulation of innovation policies. Such accounts reduce „the policy maker‟ to 
a passive recipient of rationales from outside, implying an expert-driven or 
technocratic policy process with little or no role for politics. In contrast, the policy 
studies literature treats ideas about cause-effect relationships as but one amongst 
many factors shaping public policy. As Kay (2006) puts it “policies cannot be 
analyzed apart from the policy making process”.  
 
For instance Kingdon‟s seminal work on agenda-setting in public policy (1984) has 
                                                 
13 However, whilst in the area of fiscal/monetary policy managing the policy mix means manipulating a small set 
of fairly stable policy instruments to achieve a single explicit goal, this is clearly not the case for innovation policy 
mixes. Here the set of instruments potentially in scope is larger but these instruments are also more complex and 
(as we shall argue below) less liable to be stable over time, from place to place and/or across levels of governance. 
Whilst the early use of the term in connection with the Barcelona 3% R&D objective does at least fit the concept 
of trading off different combinations of instruments at multiple levels of governance against a single, well-defined 
target, once we begin to talk of innovation policy mixes then the goals and objectives of a range of policy domains 
must be traded-off against the often rather diffuse goals and objectives associated with innovation policy 
14 Inspired by influential studies of agenda-setting and policy dynamics of Kingdon (1984) and Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993, 2002) a number of political scientists have proposed conceptualizing policy processes in an 
evolutionary way (e.g. Kerr,2002; John, 2003; Kay, 2006), In parallel a number of evolutionary economists have 
explored the dynamics of policy processes (Slembeck, 1997; Witt, 2003; Pelikán and Wegner, 2003; Moreau, 
2004). However, few connections are made between the two literatures (one exception being the work of van den 
Berg and Kallis, 2009). 
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attempted to understand the genesis of policy ideas and “what makes them catch on 
and survive in certain communities and at certain times”. Kingdon uses the term 
„policy primeval soup‟ to depict the development process of policy proposals as an 
evolutionary one. Policy systems will contain a plethora of ideas at any given time 
and these ideas compete in a complex selection environment (see also Slembeck, 
1997). At various times „policy windows‟ open and specific ideas come to 
prominence. The development of policy „streams‟, Kingdon argues, combines gradual 
and incremental evolution with instances of punctuated equilibrium. Similarly, 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) depict the political system as characterised by 
considerable stability, punctuated with periods of volatile change.  They see policy 
change in Schumpeterian terms, discussing the generation and „creative destruction‟ 
of „policy monopolies‟ which display a common political understanding in relation to 
the policy of interest, accompanied by an institutional arrangement that reinforces 
that understanding. The prominence of a particular idea (the exploitation of windows 
of opportunity or the breaking up of policy monopolies) is often contingent on the 
action of „policy entrepreneurs‟15 (Kingdon, 1984) who have a particular interest in the 
success of the policy. Such entrepreneurs may be incentivised by personal interest, 
the promotion of certain values, or the mere satisfaction of being part of the policy 
action (Kingdon calls such actors „policy groupies‟). 
 
The purpose of the above discussion is not to provide a comprehensive account of 
the origin and development of policy ideas but merely to highlight the multiple and 
complex influences at play in the process of policy formation other than theoretical 
and scholarly developments. Is there a special role for theory as a particular subset 
of „ideas‟ in this agenda setting process? Laranja et al (1998; 825) argue that 
scholarly theories are seldom adapted “wholesale in a one-to one transfer of ideas to 
policy” but rather that attractive elements of scholarly ideas tend to be „cherry-picked‟ 
by policy makers. Majone (1989) suggests that policy makers use theory in a 
selective way to justify policy action and indeed policy choices are influenced by 
norms, beliefs, goals and pressures that differ from those in the academic 
community. Policy makers may use theories to justify policies but more often policies 
may be rationalised retrospectively. Majone also notes the artificiality of 
distinguishing between policy analysis and policy advocacy, „policy innovations‟ being 
the result of objective analysis combined with advocacy and persuasion.  
 
It is important then to differentiate between rationales derived from, or directly implied 
by, scholarly theories and the specific rationales explicitly or implicitly used by policy 
makers to justify the design, selection and use of particular policies. Laranja et al 
(2008) distinguish between meta-rationales (high-level philosophies about the proper 
modes and limits of government action) which influence in turn the way in which 
specific ideas are taken up and interpreted in the policy process; and specific policy 
rationales, the adoption of which is guided by the meta-rationales in operation at the 
higher level16. The idea of meta-rationales is akin to the term „policy paradigm‟ 
proposed by Hay (2002, inspired by Thomas Kuhn (1962)), namely packages of 
related ideas that act as a filter for possible responses to problems. Importantly, new 
rationales seem not to simply substitute for old ones. As ideas are institutionalised, 
they become the foundation for shaping (allowing and/or constraining) the context in 
which future policy choices are made (Steinmo, 2003; Pelikan, 2003; Kay, 2006).  
 
                                                 
15 Policy entrepreneurs are characterised, much like business entrepreneurs, by ―their willingness to invest their 
resources—time, energy, reputation and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return‖ (Kingdon, 1984: 
p.129) 
16 Meta-rationales can prevent certain sorts of conclusions being drawn from otherwise influential theories and 
concepts. This can lead to an over-emphasis on one lesson from a body of theory at the expense of other, possibly 
equally significant, lessons. 
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In our view, then, scholarly theories at best suggest specific actors, institutions, 
relationships, spaces or other phenomena as targets of policy action in order to 
achieve certain objectives. In turn these specific policy rationales may themselves 
imply (or at least inspire) specific instruments or policy mix choices. In this view 
concepts and theories developed and critiqued by scholars on the one hand, and 
specific policy rationales held by policy makers on the other, constitute distinct, albeit 
interacting, bodies of knowledge. Fundamentally, the specific rationales formulated 
by policy makers, whether explicit or implicit and in need of unearthing, should be the 
starting point for any evaluation of the effectiveness of policy action - rather than 
theoretical rationales retrospectively mapped onto policy actions by scholars. 
 
 
4 Actors and agency 
Although innovation policy analysts are heavily influenced by evolutionary 
understandings in their approach to innovation, most of their policy prescriptions 
explicitly or implicitly assume that policy action is largely confined to the selection of 
discrete and well-defined instruments - or the development of new ones - by a single, 
purposive, (boundedly) rational and disinterested „policy maker‟ – often implicitly 
synonymous with national government or „the state‟. Making and implementing public 
policy is rarely likely to be the preserve of a single actor or group of actors (Howlett 
and Ramesh, 2003) and the processes of reform and shifts in the dynamics of 
governance already discussed make this kind of simplification increasingly 
untenable. Hay (1999, p320) appreciatively quotes Schmitter‟s (1985, p33) comment 
that the state is “an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries, 
performing a variety of not very distinctive functions”. Hay further notes (p321) that 
“although a complex variety of agencies and institutions claim their authority and 
legitimacy to intervene within civil society and the economy from „the state‟, this state 
in itself displays precious little capacity to behave as a singular actor”. Indeed Hay 
suggests that the main unifying principle behind this diversely interested set of actors 
and institutions is a shared path-dependent trajectory of periodic transformation or 
reinvention.  
 
This tendency to consider the state (or the „policy maker‟) as a single, rational or 
boundedly-rational actor reflects the early influence of welfare economics on 
mainstream policy studies. As this influence has progressively waned, new ideas 
have risen in turn. Howlett and Ramesh note a move towards a more “open-ended 
and empirically informed” „neo-institutional‟ analysis in policy studies. They also note 
the rise of interest in learning by policy actors and in discussion, argument and 
persuasion as integral parts of a policy process “conceived of as a process of 
learning by trial, error and example” (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003, p47). Increasingly 
the insights offered by these neo-institutionalist and „argumentative‟ approaches are 
being synthesised. Rhodes (2006), discussing the contribution of Scharpf (1997), 
describes the combination of an actor/ interest/ negotiation-focused approach with 
neo-institutionalist insights as „actor-centric‟ institutionalism. In this view “policy is the 
outcome of the interactions of resourceful and boundedly-rational actors whose 
capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely, but not completely, shaped by 
the institutionalised norms within which they interact” (Scharpf, 1997, p195, quoted in 
Rhodes, 2006).  
 
The policy studies literature uses the terms 'policy subsystem' (or sometimes „policy 
network‟) to describe the set of state and non-state, national and international actors 
and institutions that shape policies focused on a particular policy area in a particular 
jurisdiction at a particular time (see for instance Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Rhodes, 
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2006). According to Howlett and Ramesh ―the policy subsystem is a space where 
relevant actors discuss policy uses and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their 
interests… These interactions… occur in the context of various institutional 
arrangements surrounding the policy process, which affect how the actors pursue 
their interests and ideas and the extent to which their efforts succeed. A policy 
subsystem includes both actors who are intimately involved in a policy process as 
well as others who are only marginally so” (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003, p53-4). 
Those actors who participate more frequently and more directly are often described 
as belonging to „interest networks‟ whilst those involved to a lesser extent are 
described as belonging to „discourse communities‟. The nature of the relationship 
between the interest networks and discourse communities that compose a policy 
subsystem are seen as important shapers of the content of public policy in that area. 
Almost an infinite variety of actors and institutions in the „policy universe‟ may 
actually or potentially constitute a policy subsystem. Composition varies by country, 
by policy domain and over time (see for instance Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).  
 
These influential approaches in mainstream policy studies stress the variety of 
actors, state and non-state, individual, networked and corporate, that may be 
involved in policy processes. Despite the focus on a range of state and non-state 
„actors‟ in systemic accounts of innovation, we argue that most actors are largely 
seen as passive in relation to public policy for innovation. Prescriptive innovation 
policy studies continue to assume (in the welfare economics tradition) that policy is 
made by a unitary „policy maker‟ and even descriptive and analytical studies tend to 
focus on a single unitary state actor or on a limited set of state actors. Other actors 
are largely denied agency as regards public policy. These actors are often reduced to 
the „functions‟ they perform in the system17 and any suggestion of agency in relation 
to public policy is in the very limited and uni-directional sense that such actors are 
passive targets of public policy to be transformed by policy-induced learning into 
exhibiting behavioural changes18.  
 
This emphasis on functions is potentially problematic in several ways: first, because 
actors are often represented as performing a single explicit function in the system19; 
secondly because (despite an emphasis on institutions, actors, relationships and 
learning in the source literature) many systemic approaches to innovation policy 
implicitly privilege the structure of a system as an explanatory factor for outcomes 
whilst downplaying agency20. However, if public policy is part of the system then the 
agency of actors must be acknowledged both in relation to innovation processes and 
also to processes shaping policy problems and solutions21. 
                                                 
17 Systemic approaches to innovation policy tend to classify actors according to knowledge producing, knowledge 
using, intermediating or policy-making functions, although the literature is somewhat split on whether functions 
reside in actors and institutions or whether functions are a property of the system itself (see e.g. Chaminade and 
Edquist 2006 versus Van Lente et al 2003). Hekkert et al (2007) seem to ascribe functions both to the system and 
to individual actors. 
18 This transformation and learning is not generally acknowledged to change the ‗policy (sub)system‘ as well as 
the ‗innovation system‘. 
19 The use of function by Howells (2006) in his discussion of innovation intermediaries and intermediation is a 
typical illustration of these difficulties. Van Lente et al (2003) paint a similar picture in their account of ‗systemic 
intermediaries‘, one in which the terms actor, organization and institution are used all but interchangeably. 
Intermediary is neither an actor class nor is intermediation a function – rather intermediation is a role which can be 
played – or claimed - by a variety of actor types. 
20 Such accounts are often rather circular: for instance Hekkert et al (2007) assert that a ―well-functioning‖ 
innovation system will ―probably lead to a climate in which entrepreneurial activities blossom‖, entrepreneurial 
activities being one of the functions they identify as being required from such a well-functioning system.  
21 Bressers and O‘Toole (2005) note that adopting a ‗network‘-dominated perspective can lead scholars into static 
analyses and away from a focus on the detail of actors‘ involvement in different processes. They argue for a 
focusing-in on the processes going on within the network or system. This seems to be a particular apposite warning 
for those of us engaged in innovation policy studies. 
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Accounts which privilege structure, then, often deny agency in relation to innovation 
policy to all but „policy-makers‟ and ascribes passive systemic „functions‟ to other 
actor types. They also tend to conflate actors with the roles that they play in policy-
making and policy implementation as well as in the innovation process22. Making a 
clearer distinction between „actor types‟ and „role types‟ could be particularly 
important for comparative studies and policy learning, as we might expect that 
different types of actors may play similar roles in different national or regional 
contexts, or at different times. It could also help redress the tendency of some 
innovation policy studies to downplay variety within actor categories (e.g. individual 
researchers, SMEs, universities)23.  
 
Actors may choose (or choose not to) play multiple (complementary or contradictory) 
roles. Further, actors can choose to play roles in tension with or even in contradiction 
with those projected for or expected from them by other actors and institutions. 
Individual human actors are members of organisations, research groups, disciplinary 
communities and policy networks which, as collectives, can all have agency and 
which may play different and contradictory roles from those played by the individual 
human actors who make them up. Considering actors as playing roles in processes 
(policy processes, innovation processes), rather than seeing them as simply fulfilling 
a specific function in a pseudo-mechanical „system‟, acknowledges the reality that 
„actors‟ are defined by their agency. This agency is of course enabled, shaped and 
constrained by other actors and by institutions, which themselves have been created 
and shaped by earlier action and institutions24. Although not a primary aim of this 
paper, as a starting point we can suggest some very simple categories of role in the 
policy process which might be played by individual, group, network or organisational 
actors, whether state or non-state, domestic or international (Table 1, below).  
 
                                                 
22 A rare acknowledgement of the agency of ‗system‘ actors in relation to policy can be found in the account of 
innovation system governance by Kuhlmann and Shapira (2006). Here too, though, governance is arguably treated 
as impacting upon the innovation system (as if an exogenous force) whilst somehow the actors involved are part of 
it. Aghion, David and Foray (2009) also make a plea for more consideration of the dynamic roles human actors 
play not just in the innovation process but in the policy process from those who seek to improve innovation policy 
design and implementation. Galli and Teubal (1997) stress that organizational actors may play multiple roles. 
Finally, Wieczorek at al (2009) acknowledge the distinction between actors and the roles that they play, although 
they slip back into a functional view of the ‗innovation system‘ for much of their analysis. 
23 Although Bobrow (2006) suggests that this tendency is not confined to innovation policy debates. 
24 March and Olsen (2006) describe how institutions (in their terminology ‗rules of action‘) shape the roles actors 
play in multiple senses, including in the important indirect sense of providing beliefs and expectations which shape 
the ways in which actors chose to exercise their agency. 
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Table 1: some idealised actor roles in the (innovation) policy process 
 
Policy Principals
25
 
Actors mobilizing resources in order to achieve a policy goal or 
goals. 
Policy Entrepreneurs Actors promoting a policy problem / solution package. 
Policy Targets 
Actors targeted by policy action for behaviour change, or new 
actors (organisations or networks) created by policy action in order 
to fill a perceived gap in the system 
Policy Implementation Agents 
Existing or newly created actors in receipt of resources from a 
policy principal in order to achieve a policy outcome  
Policy Beneficiaries 
Actors who benefit (or lose out) from the impacts/outcomes of the 
policy action (e.g. patients in the case of healthcare innovation).  
 
 
None of these idealised roles are necessarily mutually exclusive. Specific actors may 
play multiple roles simultaneously (e.g. target and implementation agent, 
implementation agent and entrepreneur26) or different and multiple roles at different 
times. A similar role may also be played by different actors at different times. Policy 
action often creates new actors – organisations or networks – which then go on to 
play other roles. Relationships can also be nested, as per Principal-Agent theory (see 
e.g. Slembeck, 1997). For instance research funding agencies play two simultaneous 
roles, as agents of policy principals (typically ministries responsible for science and 
technology) and as principals who in turn transfer resources to their own agents 
(researchers, groups, teams or institutes) to actually perform research).   
 
 
5 Action, inaction and instruments 
As we have seen, much innovation policy research reflects the traditional interest of 
economic policy research (Slembeck, 1997; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999) and 
more generally of applied policy studies (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003) in the strengths 
and weaknesses, costs and benefits of single policy instruments. Policy instruments 
are widely seen as being in principle substitutable27, with the most appropriate 
instrument being the cheapest one to implement which least distorts the market 
whilst still achieving its objective. Public policy is thus a toolbox from which the 
optimal tools are (or should be) selected. In this view what ends up in the „policy mix‟ 
is taken for granted whilst the problem of potential policy interaction is simply a 
                                                 
25 We adopt here only the terminology of principal-agent theory. Peters (2005, p362) critiques a tendency to think 
of instrument choice in ―rather simple principal-agent terms, with delegation from one principal (the legislature or 
the minister) to a public agent, which uses an instrument to produce action‖. Hence our use of the term in the 
plural. 
26 For instance innovation ‗intermediaries‘ are now amongst the strong advocates of ‗systemic‘ policies 
27 ―From a purely logical and technical point of view, policy tools appear to be perfectly interchangeable‖ (Landry 
and Varone, 2005, p111). However the authors go on not only to make the common warning that the effectiveness 
of instruments will be dependent on the problem and implementation context (an issue which in theory can be 
addressed by better technical analysis) but also to argue that instruments cannot be considered outside of the 
rationales offered by and the institutional environment of the actors involved in their selection. 
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matter to factor into tool selection. The only obstacle to adding policy instruments to 
the mix is cost.  
 
In the real world „policy instruments‟ are intangible and, as a piece of social 
technology have a high degree of what science and technology studies scholars call 
interpretive flexibility, carrying quite different meanings from time to time, place to 
place and actor to actor (see e.g. Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1989). The context and 
implementation of an instrument can be fluid over time as instruments are interpreted 
and reinterpreted in the light of changing rationales. Implementation is another factor 
here, and decisions taken during implementation may be critical in determining the 
impacts of policy action, potentially leading to major variations in „the same‟ 
instrument across time and space quite independently of differences in strategies, 
policy rationales or meta-rationales (see e.g. Slembeck, 1997)28. Consider the recent 
proliferation of „innovation voucher‟ schemes, an idea transferred far and wide from 
the originating instance in the Netherlands. Such schemes can be considered to be 
at least nominally the same instrument (and are likely to be treated as such by 
innovation policy reviews) but the precise rationale, goals and means vary from 
country to country (Table 2 illustrates variety in the goals/rationales and modes of 
implementation of innovation voucher schemes in selected EU member states, based 
on InnoPolicyTrendChart records). The actual impact such schemes may have is 
likely to depend rather more on the implementation mode (e.g. how the vouchers are 
publicized, how and to whom they are allocated, what supporting guidance and 
brokerage is put in place to help firms find knowledge providers) than on whether the 
rationale usually seen as the basis for the policy transfer – that such schemes are a 
„demand-side‟ corrective to traditional approaches - is correct or not. With almost any 
policy instrument there will always be a fundamental uncertainty about which aspect 
of that instrument is actually responsible for any observed effect (Bressers and 
O‟Toole, 2005). 
                                                 
28 It is almost a truism to say that policy studies tend to ignore or downplay implementation (see e.g. Barrett, 2004 
for an account of the decline in interest in implementation studies).   
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 Table 2: Variety in innovation voucher schemes in selected EU member states 
Source: European Inventory of Research and Innovation Policy Measures, InnoPolicyTrendChart, http://www.proinno-europe.eu/ last accessed August 2009.  
Entries summarised by the authors. 
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Austria 
Innovation 
Voucher 
Austria 
     
Austrian SMEs not in any 
contract with the selected 
partner during the past 5 
years and which have received 
less than a certain amount of 
public funding. 
Universities or non-university 
public research institutes from 
Austria, any EU member state 
or from any external country. 
< € 5,000 Max. one voucher 
per year per 
company. 
Allocation on a first 
come, first served 
(FCFS) basis. 
No info 
Belgium 
Wallonia 
Technology 
vouchers 
     
Wallonian SMEs.  
 
The supported services cannot 
already be subject to public 
funding. 
One of the 22 accredited 
Wallonian research centres or 
one of the 13 research centres 
associated to the French-
speaking Hautes-écoles of 
Belgium. 
€500  Maximum 40 
technology 
vouchers per 
company per year.   
SME must co-fund 
25% of the value 
of the voucher 
Cyprus  
Innovation 
Vouchers 
     
Cypriot SMEs All public or private 
organisations in Cyprus doing 
research and/or technology 
transfer activities 
€5000 One voucher per 
company.  
Applications on 
FCFS basis 
No info 
Denmark  
Knowledge 
Voucher 
(small 
innovation 
projects) 
     
Danish SMEs that have never 
collaborated with the selected 
partner. 
A public research organisation 
or a member of The Advanced 
Technology Group (GTS 
institution) 
€6670-
13330 
No info SME must meet at 
least 50% of the 
cost of the project 
Denmark 
Research 
voucher for 
SMEs 
     
Danish SMEs not in receipt of 
other public funding.  
 
Project must meet Frascati 
manual definition of R&D. 
Danish universities, R&D 
intensive Danish hospitals, 
GTS-institutes or other 
research institution, including 
equivalent overseas research 
institutions. 
< €0.2m Partnership of at 
least one SME and 
at least one 
research 
organisation.  
SME must meet 
50% of the total 
co-funding and the 
research institution 
at least 25%. 
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Greece 
Innovation 
Vouchers for 
SMEs 
     
One or more Greek SMEs of 
the manufacturing 
sector, software industry and 
research and development 
firms 
Greek universities, 
technological colleges, 
research centres and institutes 
and “sectoral” suppliers of 
knowledge-intensive services 
“of high added value”. 
€7000 (but 
two SMEs 
may 
combine 
their 
vouchers) 
One voucher per 
company allocated 
on a FCFS basis 
while funds remain 
available. 
No info 
Hungary 
INNOCSEKK 
(Innovation 
voucher) 
     
Hungarian SMEs registered or 
having a branch office in the 
respective region. 
 
Eligible activities: project 
concept appraisal; product 
development; process 
innovation; and other 
innovation development 
services. 
No information A range 
from 
€12,000 
(project 
appraisal) - 
€120,000  
(product 
develop-
ment) 
Applications must 
be submitted in 
one region only for 
one of the listed 
activities.  
Not required - 
voucher can meet 
up to 100% of 
project costs. 
Netherlands 
Innovation 
vouchers  
     
For small vouchers, Dutch 
SMEs not previously in receipt 
of a small voucher. 
 
For large vouchers, Dutch 
SMEs. 
 
(Semi-)public knowledge 
institutes; large companies 
with R&D expenditures that 
exceed €60 million p.a.; other 
EU public knowledge 
institutes. 
€2500 
(small) or 
€7500 
(large) 
3,500 of each type 
per year. One 
small voucher per 
SME. One large 
voucher per SME 
per year. Allocation 
on a FCFS basis.  
SMEs can combine 
large vouchers for 
collective projects. 
For large vouchers, 
SME must meet at 
least one-third of 
the face value. 
Portugal 
SME Skills 
Support 
System - 
Innovation 
Voucher 
     
Portuguese SMEs. Three-year 
limit of €200,000 per 
company. 
No information <€25,000 Priority given to 
smallest firms. 
After size, 
allocation on FCFS 
basis. 
No information 
 
 
“Policy instrument” is therefore not a completely unproblematic concept. At its simplest 
the policy instrument is seen as the active means by which policy is implemented – the 
programmes, organisations, rules and regulations which affect policy outcomes. These 
instruments are by no means necessarily stable over time and across space whether in 
terms of rationales, goals or means (implementation). As we shall see in the following 
section, these policy actions frequently „harden‟ over time into new actors and 
institutions29 which become part of the changed context in which future policy processes 
(and innovation processes) occur. Further, not all 'policy' can be explained in terms of 
positive action. Conscious decisions not to intervene also count as policy choices, and 
may similarly constrain future choices.  
 
Howlett (2005) makes a potentially useful basic distinction between substantive policy 
instruments, the „hard‟ instruments which are the traditional focus of policy analysis, 
those which directly intervene in social or economic life, and 'procedural' instruments, 
„soft‟ instruments which seek to affect the participation of selected actors in the 
governance process itself. Adapting and extending this typology to encompass inaction 
as well as action might provide a more realistic framework within which to conceive of 
„policy instruments‟ (Table 3, below). All policy action can be conceptualised as the 
mobilisation of resources of one kind or another, and the deployment (or threat) of power 
remains a key resource of state actors. It is also important to note that the resource 
implications of inaction are not necessarily zero. Policy inaction at one place or time 
might lead to high costs being incurred elsewhere or at another. Thus inaction in one 
policy domain, at one level of governance, or at one time may lead to resource-intensive 
actions being taken at in another domain, at another level, or at a later time.  
 
Of course the content of public policy is broader still than 'action and inaction'. Policy 
encompasses aims, objectives, visions, rationales and models of action. Policy also 
plays a rhetorical and performative function. Policy-making activity can be an end in itself 
– being seen to have a policy about a problem can play an important political role 
regardless of whether that policy leads to effective action to solve the problem. As 
Ringeling (2005) notes, instruments can be goals from the perspective of a particular 
governance style (or meta-rationale) or from the perspective of actors in the policy 
process. In other words values and interests are bound up with instruments. In the words 
of Bressers and O‟Toole “the wrong end of the system from which to approach the 
question of policy instrument selection is from the instruments and those who choose 
them” (2005. p151). Public policy goes beyond instruments and mixes of instruments. 
Policy, conceived in this way, is the outcome of the continual interplay of two processes, 
governance (in the strict political science definition of the term and including policy 
processes shaped by ideas, networks, institutions, choices made by individual decision-
makers, etc) and politics. Acknowledging this will become still more important as 
analysts of innovation policy increasingly move on to consider the wider roles played by 
State/public actors as economic actors in their own right, that is as sources, vectors or 
purchasers of innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Aghion, David and Foray (2009) ask the question whether organisational actors and institutions should be considered 
as system structures or policy instruments, or both. 
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Table 3: Policy action and inaction 
Table adapted and extended by the authors from those of Hood (1986) and Howlett (2005) 
 
 Policy action Policy  
inaction 
 Substantive Procedural Informal power  
Mode of 
intervention 
'Hard' instruments; 
Direct interventions; 
Formal use of power 
and resources.  
 
Subsidy; 
Regulation; 
Direct incentivisation 
(e.g. through 
foregone taxation); 
Legislation 
 
 
Indirect, 'soft'; 
Mobilisation of  
other actors; building 
shared 'visions' 
 
 
Stakeholder fora, 
foresight exercises, 
etc. 
 
 
Indirect incentivisation 
(persuasion) through 
the informal use/ 
threat of state power 
 
Voluntary or self-
regulation to avoid 
threat of substantive 
action 
 
 
 
 
Active  
(explicit rejection 
of option to act) 
 
or 
 
Passive  
(implicit decision 
not to act) 
Resource 
implications 
Significant  
resources typically 
expended by state 
actors 
 
(Spending or 
foregoing of 
revenue; 
Legislative 
resources) 
Usually low/ neglible 
expenditure of 
resources by state 
actors 
 
Resources mobilised 
are largely those of 
non-state actors 
Mixed 
 
Deployment of state 
power to achieve the 
mobilisation of 
resources held by 
non-state actors 
??? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Interactions and trade-offs in the policy mix 
“Almost always, the influence of policy instruments is effectively a blend, or combination, 
of different instruments, sometimes enacted at different times and often for somewhat 
different purposes. Instruments are not parachuted onto an empty stage to debut a 
policy-relevant soliloquy” (Bressers and O‟Toole, 2005, p134). This idea of interactions 
and trade-offs between policy instruments is fundamental to the policy mix concept as it 
has originated in macroeconomic policy debates. Yet as we have seen innovation policy 
studies has tended to remain focused on the analysis of individual policy instruments, 
with at least a tacit assumption that these are perfectly interchangeable. This view 
reduces public policy to the selection of standardised instruments (or easily-understood 
combinations of non-interacting instruments) from a toolbox (Witt, 2003). However, as 
we have already argued, nominally similar policy instruments are not necessarily stable 
in terms of their rationales, goals, use and impacts across time, space or policy domains. 
Nor does public policy pursue a single goal or even a coherent and hierarchical set of 
goals - rather it pursues a broad and ever-changing range of more or less explicit and 
implicit, final and intermediate goals and objectives, many of which will conflict in the 
sense that one can only be obtained at the expense or another (Klappholz, 1964). It is 
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these policy rationales and policy goals30, and the means by which they are 
implemented, that are often in tension or conflict in the policy mix.  
 
In discussing rationales, actors and roles, and instruments, we have already argued that 
goals, rationales and implementation choices are key in determining the effects of public 
policies. These effects are felt across space and across time. Whilst a good deal of 
academic attention is devoted to the spatial implications of public policy much less 
attention has been focused on the time dimension (Pollitt, 2008). Kay (2006) critiques 
the treatment of time in policy analysis, noting that most „dynamic‟ accounts are really 
exercises in comparative statics relating to the time horizons of policies (e.g. 
short/medium-term/long-term impacts of policies). This snapshot view fails to account for 
“different rhythms, cycles and process speeds in the policy learning” (Kay, 2006: p.7). 
Pollitt (2008) also emphasises the importance of non-linear, path-dependent dynamics in 
public policy and the interaction between these and other kinds of dynamics – electoral, 
budget and planning cycles, economic cycles, organisational life cycles etc. Partly 
because of these different cycles, different classes of actors can have very different 
conceptions of time. The result of these dynamics is that goals, rationales and 
instruments can all change or disappear, existing actors can change through learning, 
adopting new roles and discarding others, whilst new actors enter the arena, new 
institutions are formed and existing ones are modified, lose their meaning or depart the 
stage. 
 
Public policy, then, unfolds over time. The impact of a policy depends on when it is 
implemented and on the path previously followed, not only by the target „economic 
system‟ (in the sense of David‟s „narrow window‟ (1987), the brief period in which the 
policy maker can influence a dynamic economic system) but also by the policy process. 
Public policies, just like innovations, display irreversibility and path-dependency effects: 
they are adopted not on a tabula rasa but in a context of pre-existing policy mixes and 
institutional frameworks which have been shaped through successive policy changes 
(Uyarra, 2010). Past policy decisions clearly constrain the range of options available for 
current decision makers (Kay, 2006; Bardach, 2006). Steinmo (2003), tracking the 
evolution of tax policy in the 20th policy, shows how the tax policies of one period set the 
foundation for tax policy reforms in subsequent ones. He notes how successful policy 
ideas become institutionalised and thereafter form part of the foundation for the beliefs of 
actors. Kay (2006) also sees past policy decisions as „legacies‟ that gradually 
institutionalise, and as institutions they restrict or enable options for future policy makers. 
The accretion of policies and institutions is a well-known phenomenon, although one 
little explored empirically (Bardach, 2006). The unintended outcomes of complex policy 
interventions can even create new problems that displace the original policy problem, as 
Wildavsky (1979, quoted by Bardach, 2006) demonstrated in connection with the US 
Medicare and Medicaid programmes.  
 
Some policy processes simply take a long time to play out (Pollitt, 2008). A corollary of 
this is that each use of a policy instrument constitutes an intervention at a certain 
moment in a continuous stream of events that both condition and constrain the evolution 
of a given instrument and which will be influenced by it (Pelikan, 2003). Interactions can 
arise between short and long term, direct and indirect effects, perhaps even undermining 
the original intended goals. Because we must grant a wide range of actors agency in 
relation to the shaping of policy we must acknowledge that the learning induced by 
                                                 
30 in Kay's (2006) term 'policy values' 
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previous policy actions can have impacts on future policy choices. This learning effect 
impairs attempts to understand cause and effect relationships over time (Witt, 2003; 
Wegner, 2003). It is not difficult to find examples of policies which have induced learning 
on the part of the actors over time, learning which has arguably partly offset any impacts 
of the policy as originally conceived31.  
 
Learning, then, is not constrained to innovation processes; it also occurs in policy 
processes. The idea of the adaptive and learning policy maker which has been taken up, 
following Metcalfe (1994), in many innovation policy studies, embodies a concept of 
policy learning which acknowledges the challenges of state intervention in a context of 
uncertainty and path dependence, but which tends to overlook the similarly uncertain 
and path-dependent evolutionary dynamics inherent in the policy process itself. We have 
argued that the sheer complexity of the policy process precludes any static-comparative 
analysis of instruments as if they were stable, discrete and independent units. In the 
words of Ringeling (2005, p192) single instruments can never be evaluated because 
“their actual state is influenced by the fact that they always come in a mix”. However this 
kind of perspective remains the basis for most policy analysis. Few studies have 
systematically explored interactions between different instruments, whether across time 
or across the other dimensions of the policy process.  
 
Gunningham and Sinclair (1999), writing in the environmental policy literature in which 
the concept of policy mix has been most recently explored, hypothesise four classes of 
policy instrument mix: those that are inherently complementary; those that are inherently 
incompatible; those that are complementary if sequenced; and those whose 
complementarity or otherwise is essentially context specific. They go further, theorising 
combinations of broad instrument types under each category (see Table 4 for 
examples), noting that in „context-specific‟ cases it is likely to be the goals of the policy 
instruments in combination which are conflicting, rather than the fundamental mode of 
operation or rationale of the instruments themselves.  UNU-MERIT et al (2009), 
exploring policy mix issues in the context of research and innovation policies 
hypothesise a similar set of general classes of interaction, although they admit a far 
greater influence of „context‟ in shaping the precise way in which specific classes of 
instrument are likely to interact. Going further still, Bressers and O‟Toole  (2005, p137) 
identify five kinds of interaction between instruments in a „blend‟ or mix (Table 5). 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The UK Research Assessment Exercise presents a good example of a repeated policy intervention which has over 
time induced learning by participants which goes beyond the intended behaviour change to constitute ‗game-playing‘. 
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Table 4: Theoretical policy instrument combinations 
Source: Authors based on Gunningham and Sinclair (1999). 
 
Inherently complementary 
instrument combinations 
Information-based strategies with any other kind of instrument; 
Voluntary or self-regulation with command-and-control regulation;  
Command-and-control/self regulation with supply-side incentives;  
Command and control/self regulation with generic economic 
instruments (i.e. non-sector specific tradeable permits or taxes); 
Legal liability rules and command-and-control/self regulation 
Generic economic instruments with compulsory reporting and 
monitoring provisions 
 
Inherently counterproductive 
instrument combinations 
Command-and-control/self regulation with generic economic 
instruments; 
Technology-based standards with performance-based standards; 
Incentive-based instruments with legal liability rules 
Instruments complementary if 
sequenced 
Self-regulation followed by command-and-control;  
Self-regulation followed by generic economic instruments 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Five forms of influence or confluence in policy instrument ‘blends’ or mixes 
Source: Authors based on Bressers and O‟Toole, 2005, p137. 
 
Increased intensity of policy 
intervention 
Multiple instruments targeting a specific actor or group of actors 
Integration of multiple 
instruments into one 
interactive process between 
government and target groups 
Multiple instruments targeting different actors/actor groups involved 
in the same process 
Instruments and actions at 
different levels of governance 
Interactions between instruments and actions taken at different 
levels of multi-level governance 
Competition and co-operation 
between different but 
interdependent policy fields 
Interactions and tensions across policy areas/domains 
Mutual strengthening or 
weakening of the effects of 
interventions at different 
points of action in the broader  
system 
Interactions mediated through processes in a broader system 
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The approaches discussed above are primarily focused on interactions in what we might 
call „designed‟ mixes – the intentional combination of two or more instruments. The time 
dimension is present only in the limited sense that sequencing of instruments is 
acknowledged to be important, and to the extent that „context‟ is acknowledged as a 
potential shaper of interactions. We have already argued that the actor and institutional 
context in which instruments operate will be crucial in determining their effects. The 
implications of this for policy mixes are, first, that it seems highly unlikely that, regardless 
of theoretical complementarities, complementarities in practice can be achieved by the 
simple accumulation of instrument after instrument. At some point theoretically 
complementary instruments may begin to interact in negative or contradictory ways if 
layered one upon the other. In other words these characteristics of interactions are 
relative (an instrument is only complementary or negative in relation to another 
instrument or mix of instruments) and potentially transient. Policy instruments are flexible 
and evolve over time, and, because the wider institutional and actor environment in 
which they operate can also change, the kinds of interaction seen may change over 
time, and from context to context, place to place. If complementarity is not a simple 
matter then nor is substitution. It seems difficult to imagine that two different policy 
instruments could ever be perfect substitutes – and the extent to which instruments 
might substitute for one another will change over time.  
 
In our view the Bressers and O‟Toole framework presents a useful starting point from 
which to attempt to build a more sophisticated conceptualization of interactions. The five 
categories themselves seem to us to be partially overlapping. At the same time several 
of their „forms of influence‟ are better seen as dimensions of policy mix interactions. So, 
for instance, there is the dimension of policy space, that is the abstract space in which 
different policy domains coexist. There is a governance level dimension, representing 
interactions across multiple hierarchical levels of governance. There is also a 
geographical dimension – policy mix interactions occur in real space as well as in these 
abstract policy and governance spaces. Finally there is the dimension of time. Putting 
these four dimensions to one side, we are left with three kinds of policy mix interaction 
from the original five, namely interactions between instruments targeting the same actor 
or group of actors, interactions between instruments targeting different actors/groups 
involved in the same process, and interactions between instruments targeting points of 
action which may seem to be far removed but which interact because the processes or 
actors targeted prove ultimately to be linked by other processes in a broader „system‟. 
To these we would add another possibility. So far we have considered interactions 
between unambiguously distinct instruments. However we must also allow for the 
possibility that „the same‟ instruments will interact with each other across one or more of 
the possible dimensions (for instance, between different levels of governance or over 
time). Finally, we should remember the sources of potential tension between instruments 
already discussed: conflicting rationales, conflicting goals and conflicting approaches to 
implementation. Thus we are left with some elements of a working conceptualisation of 
policy mix interactions in terms of dimensions, forms of interaction and potential 
underlying sources of tension. These are reproduced in Table 6. 
 
Some of these interactions are identifiable in the policy mix affecting innovation within 
the North West of England (for a fuller account see Flanagan and Uyarra, 2008). When 
considering the impact of public policy on innovative activity in the region, we can see a 
policy mix that is complex in terms not only of levels of governance and policy domains, 
but also in terms of actors, roles, rationales and goals. Most of the science and 
innovation activity in the Northwest of England occurs outside the direct influence of 
regional innovation policy. To the extent that it is influenced by public policy, it is largely 
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driven by national non-innovation policies (such as defence, health, energy and security) 
and the actions of firms and major public sector organisations such as the National 
Health Service (NHS) pursuing their own goals. The effects of this 'non-innovation policy' 
are a major challenge for the region. Indeed, 'vulnerability' to outside economic and 
policy change is a key concern driving the region‟s formal innovation policy. The policy 
mix also has a complex temporal footprint, with many of the policy decisions most 
important in influencing innovation activity in the region today having been made in the 
distant past. This kind of case provides a good illustration of the need to go beyond 
simple „toolbox‟ or portfolio approaches to conceptualising the policy mix for innovation. 
Whilst regional authorities consider an ever expanding menu of policy options in order to 
address region-specific problems, the focus of attention cannot be solely on regional 
initiatives and regional providers of innovation-related services but rather must be on the 
totality of factors influencing innovation in the region.  
 
Cases of this kind reinforce the profound difficulty of achieving a more active governance 
of the policy mix affecting innovation. Whilst formal and informal mechanisms often exist 
to promote „co-ordination‟ within the domain of „innovation policy‟ across multiple levels 
of governance32, formal or informal mechanisms for evaluating and governing the wider 
policy mix affecting innovation are largely absent. In our view innovation policy studies 
systematically underestimate the challenge complexity poses to policy co-ordination. 
They view complexity as arising from the widening and deepening processes described 
earlier, perhaps also acknowledging the uncertain, multi-actor nature of the innovation 
process, whilst tending to downplay the inherent dynamics of the policy process itself as 
a source of irreducible complexity. Better co-ordination is seen as the unproblematic 
outcome of „better governance‟, something which can be achieved through the 
application of new, procedural instruments. However, procedural instruments introduce 
further complexity into the system to be co-ordinated, both directly by the simple addition 
of new actors, new roles, new institutions, but also indirectly by virtue of their inherent 
interpretive flexibility. This problem may be exacerbated by the fact that it is rather easier 
to create new mechanisms than it is to remove ones that have become institutionalised.  
 
The absurd but logical outcome of seeking to manage complexity with new coordination 
mechanisms is that additional coordinating mechanisms will periodically have to be 
created to coordinate the older ones, and so on and so forth in an infinite regress of the 
kind predicted by the well-known „map and the territory‟ metaphor33. In fact Lindblom 
(1958) offered a similar critique of the assumption that policy processes need active co-
ordination (and therefore the creation of new roles, structures or institutions for co-
ordination) several decades ago34. With a large number of explicit and implicit, and 
potentially mutually conflicting policy goals at play in the messy real world, Lindblom  
(1959) famously argued that „agencies‟ must of necessity proliferate in tandem with the 
                                                 
32 The UK approach to multi-level, multi-actor policy mix co-ordination is essentially a two-track system of semi-
formal and informal policy co-ordination through a variety of interactions, cross-memberships and co-ordinating bodies 
coupled with a more formal system of monitoring and accountability under a system of indicator-driven targets. These 
seem inadequate as a framework for wider 'policy mix' co-ordination as they promote efforts at 'joined-up' government 
(or governance) only within traditionally conceived silos. 
33 Any map of a territory would, to be truly accurate, have to contain a representation of itself representing the territory, 
including a map representing the territory, and so on, in infinite regress. 
34 Ironically Lindblom was criticising the Dutch economist Tinbergen for over-rationalising the policy process. 
Tinbergen (1952, 1956) proposed an approach to the modeling of economic policy problems that emphasized clear and 
distinct policy goals. In Tinbergen‘s view there must be as many instruments as goals in order to model the trade-offs 
and resolve the ‗best‘ solutions.  Today it is the (evolutionary) economists who are stressing the profound challenges of 
co-ordination (see for instance Aghion, David and Foray, 2009) and it is innovation policy scholars who often 
downplay them.  
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number of policy goals and that the only co-ordination possible is adaptive mutual co-
ordination. In this view agent complexity is the unavoidable resultant of goal diversity 
and ongoing mutual adaptation between agents is not a symptom of fragmentation but 
the only possible route to „co-ordination‟ between diverse goals. 
 
. 
Table 6: Conceptualising policy mix interactions: dimensions, forms of interaction and potential 
sources of tension 
 
Dimensions of interaction 
 
Forms of interaction 
 
Policy ‘space’ 
Governance 
Geography 
Time 
 
Between different instruments targeting the same actor 
or group (within or across dimensions) 
Between different instruments targeting different 
actors/groups involved in the same process (within or 
across dimensions) 
Between different instruments targeting different 
processes in a broader ‘system’ (within or across 
dimensions) 
 
Between nominally ‘the same’ instruments (across the 
different dimensions) 
 
Possible sources of tension between instruments in the policy mix 
 
Conflicting rationales 
Conflicting goals 
Conflicting implementation approaches 
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7 Conclusions 
The emergence of the policy mix concept into common use in the field of innovation 
policy studies provides us with a (narrow) window of opportunity to re-conceptualise the 
basic and often hidden assumptions of innovation policy in order to better deal with a 
messy and complex, multi-level, multi-actor reality. We have argued that the way in 
which the term „policy mix‟ is currently used in innovation policy studies puts policy 
complexity into a black box rather than tackling it.  Much of the innovation policy 
literature which attempts to deal with complexity treats policy makers as translators of 
theoretical rationales into action, denies agency to actors in relation to policy change, 
remains focused on a superficial analysis of instruments (despite the supposed 
emphasis on the mix and interactions) and treats policy interactions as something to be 
designed out of existence by „better‟ policy making (co-ordination). In doing so we, as a 
community of policy scholars, run the risk of conflating means and ends, and maps with 
territories.  
 
We would argue instead that policy processes are better thought of as a subset of the 
broader category of innovation processes.  Policy processes are not amenable to 
instrumental rationality any more than are innovation processes – the focus should be on 
incremental/adaptive learning, experimentation, reflection, debate and argument about 
means/ends, and even creative tensions. Politics isn‟t something that we reluctantly 
must acknowledge but which gets in the way of rational analysis and therefore good 
policy making but the source of ideas, values and the mechanism for resolving the trade-
offs which will be inherent in the policy mix for innovation. The role of innovation policy 
studies should be to highlight these trade-offs and promote open debates about them.  
 
Policy mix interactions manifesting themselves in relation to innovation policy outcomes 
have a complex, multi-level, multi-actor - and temporally distributed - character. This is 
likely to make specific instances of interaction - and even repeated instances of 
particular classes of interaction - difficult to detect. As well as a challenge to scholarly 
analysis this is a practical issue for governance and policy learning. Of course some of 
the innovation policy studies literature does explicitly acknowledge the multi-level, multi-
actor, negotiated nature of public policy (e.g. Kuhlmann and Shapira, 2006). But even 
where explicitly discussed, processes of negotiation and the need for „compromise‟ are 
generally seen as unproblematic outcomes which can be assured by simple soft 
(procedural) policy innovations such as the better use of „strategic policy intelligence‟ 
such as evaluation or foresight, or better „co-ordination‟. But  these new procedural 
policy instruments have even more interpretive flexibility than the traditional substantive 
„levers‟ of public policy. How can we hope to tell when these instruments are working 
well? Even if we can tell, how can we attribute that success to a particular cause-effect 
relationship?  
 
Despite the importance attached to „strategic policy intelligence‟ by innovation policy 
analysts, little empirical attention has been devoted to actual processes of policy 
learning. Much more empirical effort is needed to investigate actual, as opposed to 
idealised, processes of policy learning, and to better understand the roles experts, 
analysts and evaluators play in those processes vis a vis other actors. Sadly, much 
innovation policy analysis today, at least in Europe, is dependent on a very small 
empirical base, largely consisting of commissioned evaluation studies and template 
driven monitoring exercises. Such processes cannot form the empirical basis for 
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sensible learning and prescription. We thus need to move towards substantial empirical 
policy histories akin to the innovation histories which provided most of our understanding 
of the innovation process. 
 
As with innovation, change is probabilistic rather than deterministic and a better 
understanding of the policy process can no more enable us to predict policy outcomes 
than a better understanding of the innovation process has enabled us to predict 
innovation outcomes. This is effectively acknowledged by the recent „evolutionary turn‟ in 
mainstream policy studies35. Innovation policy studies, too, claims to be influenced by 
evolutionary thinking but the relevance of these insights is paradoxically not fully 
acknowledged by those who seek to translate them into policy prescriptions. An 
evolutionary theory of the policy process cannot be predictive or firmly prescriptive about 
specific policies. However it can tell us about the constraints on and potentialities of 
public action (Kerr, 2002: p334). The scope for successful policy action in an 
evolutionary world is more limited than in the mechanistic world inhabited by many 
innovation policy studies, and any policy action will shape and constrain the future. 
Acknowledging this should be our starting point for thinking about the prescriptive scope 
of innovation policy studies in the future. As Richard Nelson noted in The Moon and the 
Ghetto (1977, p18): “the coin of rational analysis is likely to be devalued by trying to 
achieve what cannot be bought by rational coin”. 
 
This has profound implications for the scope and focus of innovation policy studies and 
for what such studies can realistically hope to achieve in terms of policy prescriptions. As 
analysts we need to understand and treat policy-making as it is and not as we would like 
it to be. Innovation policy studies has progressively built up a kind of normative structure 
around an idea of „innovation systems‟ which is derived from and which claims 
legitimacy from empirical and comparative innovation studies and from evolutionary 
accounts of technological and economic change. This normative structure assumes an 
underlying or achievable rationality and coherence to the „system‟ as a target for policy 
action which is unrealistic (see Caracostas, 2007, for a policy-maker‟s critique of this 
tendency). This normative structure has become self-referencing and a set of widely-
repeated policy recommendations have effectively become a kind of STI policy folk 
wisdom, seldom fully explained and rarely questioned. We suggest that what is needed 
in innovation policy studies is a dose of humility about the scope for prescription coupled 
with a new wave of rich empirical studies of actual policy processes, implementation and 
impacts. Ultimately, better prescriptions should come from a more realistic, more 
empirical and more experimental approach to innovation policy.  A particular focus for 
sustained empirical research might be on the uses and usefulness of the procedural 
instruments particularly associated with „systems‟ rationales. We also need to do more to 
uncover and critique the policy rationales implicit in interventions and to explore the 
tensions between these and the goals to which they are aligned, rather than simply to try 
to dictate them. We need to better understand the relationships between these 
rationales and the theories and concepts from which they often claim legitimacy and 
through the lenses of which we unquestioningly review them. We need deep 
comparative studies of similar instruments and of actors‟ roles in different settings. 
Finally we need to look at policy learning in the context not just of innovation systems but 
also of broader policy processes. How does learning happen in the policy process and 
who is involved? As Peters (2005, p361) notes, most work on policy learning assumes 
that instruments are “in essence technical instruments that are largely independent of 
                                                 
35 and by those evolutionary economists who have started to explore the policy process, such as Moreau (2004), Witt 
(2003), Pelikán and Wegner (2003) and van den Berg and Kallis (2009). 
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the context within which they are being employed. This assumption is almost certainly 
incorrect”.  
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